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4Abbreviations
2G Stands for second generation mobile technology (part of name)
3G Stands for third generation mobile technology (also part of name)
DNA Name of mobile service provider
EU European Union
FICORA Finnish Communication Regulatory Authority
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GSM Global System for Mobile communication
H.E. Her Excellency
HPY Helsingin Puhelinyhdistys (abbreviation, part of name)
HTC Helsinki Telephone Corporation
HTF Helsingfors Telefonförening (abbreviation, part of name)
ICT Information and Communication Technology
IN Intelligent Network
IP Internet Protocol
ISP Internet Service Provider
IVO Imatran Voima Osakeyhtiö, state owned power company
NMT Nordic Mobile Telephony
OECD Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development
PABX Private Automatic Branch Exchange
PT Posts and Telecommunications (abbreviation, part of name)
RSL COM Company name
SMP Significant Market Power
USD Currency unit, United States’ dollar
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
xDSL Generic name for family of DSL (Digital Subscriber Line) technologies
5This report is a description of the Finnish telecommunications sector and the Finnish telecommunications
policy. The target group is international sector experts who wish to get a good basic understanding of the
Finnish telecommunications sector, with all its peculiarities, and the underlying policy. The Finnish tele-
communications sector described in this publication presents the situation in autumn 2002.
The report is brief. Initiated readers need to consult other sources, analysing data, sector reports, legis-
lation, annual reports, etc.
The report aims at describing the policy as the Ministry has either expressed or implemented it. The
report also includes some descriptions of the Ministry’s rationale for the policy. Any policy includes distinct
selection between options and alternatives. Such selection necessarily means that all parties cannot be
equally satisfied; thus some degree of dissatisfaction may be considered normal.
The Finnish policy has been essentially neutral towards operators of different age and size, not biased
against the many old operators, or against entrants, except for some obligations imposed on operators with
Significant Market Power. The alternative main policy line would have been asymmetric policy and regula-
tion, used in some countries with one strong incumbent.
The author (Mr. Arno Wirzenius, Teleplanning A. Wirzenius Ltd.) has benefited from numerous discus-
sions with various stakeholders and other commenting persons. However, the views expressed in the report
are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Ministry of Transport and Communications.
Helsinki, 15 January 2003
Harri Pursiainen
Director-General
Communications Department
1 Introduction
6
71 In the early 1990’s different licences were granted for different purposes, e.g. voice and data communications. The number of operators will increase significantly after the Communications
Market law is enacted. The reason is that the same law will also covers broadcasting type network operators. Operators will be communications operators, not telecommunications operators.
Table 1.
Key facts about Finland, year 2001 unless indicated
Area 338,145 km2
Population 5,195,000
Population density 15 inh / km2
Population growth 0.15 % / a
Urban population 60 %
Official languages Finnish and Swedish (5.7 %)
Literacy 100 %
Life expectancy 77 yrs
GDP / capita (1999) USD 24,900
Main natural resource Forests (76 % of land area)
Source: Statistics Finland, Telecommunications statistics
2.1 Country background
Finland is a North European country, with rather scarce
natural resources except for forests. It is located at the
same latitude as Alaska. Its only valuable resource is the
population, a mere 5.2 million inhabitants in a country
slightly larger by area than the UK and Ireland together, or
slightly smaller than Germany.
Finland’s written history covers about 1000 years. At
this time Sweden took over the then tribal area. After a
number of wars between Sweden and Russia, Russia took
over Finland in 1809. Finland became a Grand Duchy
under the Czar of Russia.
In 1917 Finland declared independence from Russia,
and has since then been an independent republic. In 1995
Finland joined the EU.
Its parliament is unicameral with 200 seats. Members
are elected for four years terms using a proportional sys-
tem, resulting in a multi-party parliament with no single
majority party. The outcome is coalition cabinets, reduc-
ing the occurrence of abrupt policy changes after parlia-
mentary elections. The Head of State is the President,
elected by direct presidential ballot for six years. The cur-
rent president is H.E. Ms. Tarja Halonen, elected in 2000.
After a civil war in 1918 and two wars against the
Soviet Union during 1939 to 1944, the country has man-
aged to establish itself as an industrialised country.
Over the years Finland has adopted a Scandinavian
type structure of society, with a high taxation level and
more social services than in extreme market economies.
Finland is one of the five Nordic countries (Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden).
2.2 Sector history
The first telephone connection in Finland was commis-
sioned in 1877, one year after its invention. Local tele-
phone companies (telcos) were founded from 1882 on-
wards, using a multitude of corporate forms. Many of the
telcos were co-operatives. In the initial years there was no
state involvement in the sector.
New small telcos were created on a continuous basis.
In 1938 the number was 815, with a total of about
150,000 connections. The average size was thus a mere
180. The vast majority of the telcos were simply a small
manual switchboard in a corner of a farm kitchen.
The very small telcos were not viable, particularly when
automatic switching was introduced. The solution was
mergers and take-overs, not bankruptcy. Mergers occurred
almost from the outset. The merger rate increased from
the 1950’s, ultimately reducing the number to below 50.
Since the sector was liberalised, during the 1990’s, the
number has again increased, due to a number of entrants,
various specialised joint ventures and subsidiaries, each
with its own licence. See Figure 1.
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2 Finnish telecoms in a nutshell
8Table 2.
The Finnish telecommunications
sector in 2001 in a nutshell
YARDSTICK FINLAND COMPARISON
Total operator revenue euro 4691 million
- as portion of GDP 3.5% Western Europe 3.7
Fixed telephones 2,806,000
Mobile telephones 4,175,000
Fixed penetration 54.1 / 100 inh. High income countries 59.7
Mobile penetration 80.4 / 100 inh. High income countries 50.2
Fixed penetration 121 / 100 househ.
Mobile penetration 178 / 100 househ.
Internet penetration 51 / 100 househ. EU 38
Sources: Telecommunications Statistics 2002,
ITU World Telecommunication Indicators 2002
Table 3.
Name history of Sonera, parent company
SONERA Name used in this report
The Telegraph Office of Finland State organisation, 1917 - 1927
Posts and Telegraphs of Finland, State organisation,
later Posts and Telecommunications merger with Posts of Finland, 1928 - 1989
of Finland,
Posts and Telecommunications Unincorporated state-owned enterprise,
of Finland 1990 - 1993
PT Finland Limited liability company,
with two main subsidiaries, Finland Post Ltd.
and Telecom Finland, 1994 - June 1998
Telecom Finland Group plc Demerger, telecommunications and
postal functions separated,
July 1998 - January 1999
Sonera Group plc Name change, January 1999 - September 1999
Sonera Corporation Merger with subsidiary,
name change after merger, October 1999 -
Source: Sonera prospectus for public offering of shares,
October 1999. Sonera’s predecessors were included in the state budget until 1989.v
Table 4.
Name history of Elisa
ELISA Name used in this report
Helsinki Telephone Association Financial association (co-operative type),
1882 - June 1998
Telephone Co-operative HPY Change of corporate form to co-operative,
June 1998 - May 1999
HPY Holding - HTF Holding Oyj Abp May 1999 - June 2000
Elisa Communications Corporation July 2000 -
Source: HPY Holding - HTF Holding Oyj Abp Preliminary Offering Circular,
May 1999, and http://elisa.com. Note that operator activities were run in a subsidiary,
Helsinki Telephone Corporation (HTC) during 1994 - June 2000. HTC was merged
with HPY Holding in June 2000.
Even if no legal or formal monopoly existed, compet-
ing licences were usually not granted. Thus each telco
had a de facto monopoly in its local service area.
The predecessor of Sonera, a traditional state depart-
ment, was created after independence, taking over the
former telegraphy business run by the Russian adminis-
tration. It started telephony service in some areas and also
took over some local telcos.
Long distance telephony was originally run as sepa-
rate private companies. In 1934 the Government (Son-
era) took over the largest long distance operator. Sonera
also ran international telephony as a monopoly. The gen-
eral approach of Sonera was overpriced long distance and
international charges and subsidised local charges. The
situation was to some extent understandable as Sonera
had more rural areas (3/4 of the land area, 1/4 of the
lines) than the local telcos (1/4 of the land area, 3/4 of
the lines).
The first automatic switches were commissioned in
Helsinki in 1922. Automatisation of the network gained
momentum in late 1940’s and 1950’s, and was complet-
ed in 1980. Long distance telephony was initiated in 1958.
Digitalisation started in 1977 and was completed in 1996.
Key data about the telecommunications sector is shown
in Table 2.
2.3 Camps in the multi-operator
system
2.3.1 Name development of main camps
This description is based on the situation before the merger
between Telia and Sonera. See Chapter 2.3.5.
For the ease of foreign readers the report uses the
present names of operators and camps and their prede-
cessors rather than the names valid from time to time.
The initiated reader will get more detailed information e.g.
from available literature, see Chapter 5.
The main name changes of the main camps are pre-
sented in Table 3.
9The name Finnet is used as an umbrella name for the
members of the Finnet Association, an association of the
private telephone operators in Finland, and their subsidi-
aries and joint ventures.
The Finnet Association was founded in 1921 as the
Association of Telephone Companies. The Association
changed its name to Finnet Association in 1996.
Over the years all private operators joined the Associa-
tion, until Elisa and its associates separated in 2001, with
some other separating companies later. The remainder of
the companies continue as Finnet. For ease of the foreign
reader, the new, smaller, camp will be called “New Finnet”
in this report, even if the name is not official or even used
in Finland.
2.3.2 Main development
Before liberalisation Finland has had two distinct camps:
Sonera and the private operators. Until the early 1990’s
all operators were part of these two camps. The liberalisa-
tion process changed the main picture in two ways:
• a number of small entrants commenced
operation (from early 1990’s); and
• the existing private operator camp (Finnet) split
into two camps when Elisa and its associates
separated from the other private operators
(2001). Some operators also joined the Sonera camp.
2 The revenue figures in Table 5 include also other revenue than operator revenue, such as sales of terminal equipment, computers, cable television, dictionaries, etc.  The Finnet GSM 900
service commenced operation in 2001.
2.3.3 Market share
The market share shown in Table 5 is based on the camp
status as of October 2002.
The table shows that Sonera alone has almost 50 % of
the total market. Elisa has one third, New Finnet one sev-
enth, and all entrants together a mere 7 %.
Figure 2 shows market share by sector. Market share
for fixed and mobile is based on connections, market share
for national and international long distance traffic is based
on traffic distribution between fully competitive camps
(anybody can use the service without contract in advance).
Revenue based market shares are not published.
Sonera’s growth has been mainly organic, only a minor
part is due to take-overs of some existing operators. Son-
era has focussed on mobile communications and is the
undisputed market leader for mobile communications in
Finland. Sonera has used its expertise in mobile for its
international expansion. Sonera also focuses on corporate
services.
Elisa’s growth has been a combination of organic growth
and take-overs. The Finnet camp has grown, but also di-
minished in take-overs and other camp changes. New en-
trants have mainly started from scratch. For more details
see below.
Table 5.
Market share based on gross
revenue and connections in 20012
GROSS REVENUE (euro million) CONNECTIONS (million)
Camp euro Share % Fixed Mobile Total Share %
Sonera 2278 48 0.89 2.28 3.17 49
Elisa 1463 31 1.00 1.19 2.19 34
New Finnet  654 14 0.89 0.03 0.92 14
Entrants  323   7 0.02 0.18 0.20 3
Total 4719 100 2.81 3.67 6.48 100
Source: Telecommunications Statistics 2002
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2.3.4 Split of the private operator camp
As indicated in Chapter 2.2, the Finnish sector history is
to a large extent a restructuring history, with new enter-
prises, mergers, take-overs, etc., as in any normally work-
ing sector based on a market economy. Old restructuring
will not be presented, but recent events will be described
in this Chapter. The most important new feature is the
emergence of a third major operator camp.
When liberalisation started, all existing private opera-
tors were part of the Finnet camp. Most Finnet companies
were co-operatives, with Elisa alone being about as big as
the other telcos together. See Chapter 2.4.
In order to offer various national and international serv-
ices, the Finnet companies created joint ventures. The
most important of these joint ventures were for mobile
and international services and for country-wide backbone
networks and corporate services. In some cases important
customers were minority stakeholders in the joint ventures.
Three co-operatives, including the largest (Elisa), were
converted into normal for-profit companies and were list-
ed on the stock exchange. The share and the right to a
line were unbundled. The companies also started to dis-
tribute dividend.
Over a period of time Elisa acquired a significant stake
in the two other listed companies, gaining control of the
business. Other ownership was mainly previous user-own-
ers and no strategic owner existed. The control was subse-
quently used to increase ownership to majority level. Elisa
also acquired control of a few other medium-size local
telcos. Sonera has also taken over control of some Finnet
companies in a similar way. Elisa itself has created mech-
anisms to prevent take-overs.
In parallel with this development, negotiations were
held regarding restructuring of the joint ventures and also
otherwise strengthening co-operation and joint business.
Negotiations were not successful. Elisa and its associates
separated from the Finnet camp and formed their own
camp. Subsequently Elisa bought out the other Finnet com-
panies from the most important joint ventures, in particu-
lar mobile (Radiolinja). Elisa sold its stake in the national
long distance operator joint venture to the remaining Finnet
companies (New Finnet).
New Finnet used the proceeds of the sales to create
three new mobile operators:
• Suomen 2G (network operator for GSM,
second generation);
• Suomen 3G3  (network operator for 3G); and
• DNA (service provider for GSM and in
the future also 3G).
The three companies are presently directly owned by the
New Finnet companies, but have slight differences in own-
ership. Perhaps the most important difference is that Swed-
ish Netcom (Tele2) has a 20 % stake in Suomen 3G. Oth-
erwise the control is with the same owners, even if the
three companies are legally independent. The three com-
panies are some of the few cases in the world in which
networks and services are separated in independent com-
panies with different ownership.
The New Finnet companies also have some other joint
ventures.
In September 2002 the New Finnet camp published a
major consolidation plan. All significant joint ventures will
be transferred from direct ownership to one holding com-
pany, Finnet Ltd.
None of the take-overs or other camp changes can be
classified as hostile, even if sometimes implemented
against the wish of the management and some owners.
The take-overs are essentially normal acquisition of mar-
ket share, customer base and presence in certain parts of
the country. The take-overs are part of the consolidation
process on-going in Finland for almost 100 years. It is
interesting to note that entrants so far did not participate
in take-overs.
Industry observers follow in particular the viability of
the New Finnet camp, to see whether it succeeds in es-
tablishing itself as a third stabilised and credible major
player in Finland.
The Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications
has not taken any stance with respect to take-overs and
consolidation. Except for Sonera, an active role in owner-
ship changes is outside the scope of the Ministry.
From a sector policy perspective the most important
and positive feature is that a third significant national
operator camp has emerged. Finland will continue to be
one of the most competitive markets. Few other countries
have three country-wide full-service operators. Thus the
Ministry is satisfied with the new competitive set-up.3 3G stands for third generation mobile telecommunications.
11
4 Source: www.elisa.com.
Source: Telecommunications Statistics 2002
Table 6.
Main entrants in Finland, data for 2001
COMPANY MAIN BUSINESS REVENUE EURO STAFF
MILLION
Song networks Fixed (local, nat’l, int’l), Internet 49.8 (Finland) 353 (Finland)
Telia Mobile (partially service provider), 112 (Finland) 670 (mobile only, Finland)
WLAN, mobile terminal eqpt
Jippii Group Oyj Internet, nat’l, int’l, mobile 87.2 (total) 446 (total)
(service provider)
RSL COM FINLAND OY Corporate services including fixed 32 (Finland) 100 (Finland)
(local, nat’l, int’l), mobile (service
provider), Internet, data communications
Cubio int’l, nat’l, directory services, toll-free 8 (Finland) 20 (Finland)
Communications and premium rate services, corporate services
2.3.5 New entrants
The description of Telia’ operations
in Finland describes the situation be-
fore the Telia-Sonera merger. See
Chapter 2.3.6.
The new entrants are very differ-
ent. Most are niche enterprises, fo-
cussing on rather narrow business
segments. The operators with the
widest business cover are Telia (and
its predecessor Telivo) and Song Net-
works. Telivo was a spin-off of the
national state-owned power company IVO, using the pow-
er grid as a backbone network platform. It started offering
limited fixed, national long distance and international serv-
ices in 1993, and mobile services in 1998.
Telia has subsequently sold its fixed business in 2001
to Song Networks, including long distance and interna-
tional telephony, and a minority stake (40 %) of Corenet
Oy, a spin-off of the state railways.
Most other entrants offer corporate services, low cost
international access, services to closed user groups, or
similar. A few mobile service providers have entered the
market, with modest success.
Subsidiaries of international operators or consortia of-
fer mainly services to business operators. From a Europe-
an perspective Finland is a small and different market,
more competitive than most other national markets. Thus
there is little profit achievable. The presence of many in-
ternational operators is probably due to the need to cover
all Western European countries and thus offer multina-
tional customers coverage of all European countries. An-
other possible reason for presence is to monitor a truly
competitive market.
Out of the entrants, only Telia and Song Networks have
some significant amount of network. Most other entrants
operate either as service providers, leasing network ca-
pacity from existing network operators, or own limited net-
work resources e.g. in the main business centre in the
capital or operate radio links to major customers.
The new entrants are not organised as a group or camp.
A summary of main entrants is presented in Table 6.
After publishing of the above list, New Finnet bought
RSL COM.
2.3.6 International investors in Finland
Since liberalisation Finland has no restrictions on foreign
ownership. From a European perspective Finland is a small
market, different, and rather competitive.
International investors have entered the Finnish tele-
communications market in four main ways, in historical
order:
• as entrants (see Chapter 2.3.5);
• Swedish Netcom (Tele2) has a 20 % stake in Suomen
3G (New Finnet’s 3G network operator);
• Vodafone made an agreement on co-operation with
Radiolinja (Elisa’s mobile subsidiary); and
• Telia and Sonera have agreed to merge
(see Chapter 2.4).
When the Finnish 3G licences were issued, the New Finnet
companies wanted to get a credible international partner
for developing the business and to strengthen the consorti-
um when applying for the licence. The position of Netcom
in the consolidated New Finnet structure is still to be seen.
In early 2002 Elisa announced an agreement on co-
operation between Radiolinja and Vodafone. Elisa’s inter-
im report states4 : Vodafone, the largest mobile operator in
the world, and Radiolinja signed on February 14, 2002 a
business and partner agreement. For Radiolinja, service
of multi-national customers, dual branding for certain
customer groups, GPRS roaming and similar international
12
The multi-operator structure combined with co-opera-
tive ownership also worked in a similar way to competi-
tion, keeping management alert. If the owners were not
satisfied, they could change management and / or decide
on a merger with another telco. An efficient telco was in a
good position to take over less efficient neighbours. Son-
era was usually very active in competing for take-overs,
and indeed took over more than 430 telcos6 .
In addition to the mainstream co-operatives, a few tel-
cos were municipal departments. They generated profit to
the municipality owner. A few small telcos were also nor-
mal for-profit enterprises. Also the municipal and for-profit
telcos had some degree of competitive pressure in the form
of benchmark competition, limiting the degree of monop-
oly rents that could be extracted.
During the last 70 years two distinct camps have de-
veloped: the private telcos (mainly co-operatives), and the
state-owned Sonera. At times the tension between the
camps has been strong, with a strong political flavour in
the past. The tension has been an effective hindrance to
cartel type arrangements between the camps. Socialisa-
tion of all private telcos was proposed in the 1930’s and
1950’s. The proposals were not successful.
From 1985 onwards the private telcos organised most
country-wide services as joint ventures, a kind of club
ownership or federative structure. These joint ventures
offered services to large corporate customers, mobile serv-
ices, long distance and international communications,
Internet, etc. See also Chapter 2.3.4.
5 In addition the state pension fund owns a 0.4 % stake.
6 Source: The study of alternative solutions for the provision of telecommunications services in developing countries, Case study based on the regulatory and organisational structures in Finland
(Case Finland), 1992, FINNIDA, Ministry of Transport and Communications, The World Bank.
products and services form the cornerstone of the partner
agreement. In the same connection, an umbrella agree-
ment was signed between Elisa Communications Corpora-
tion and Vodafone on cooperation enhancement.
The announcement does not disclose any co-operation
on ownership level, and the final outcome of the enhanced
co-operation is still to be seen.
2.4 Corporate structures
Sonera was initially fully state owned. Sonera has been
partially privatised in several steps. Until the merger with
Telia, shares have been sold to investors in public offer-
ings. The Finnish Government retained a majority stake of
52.8 %5 .
Over the years the Finnish Government has been look-
ing for a strategic owner for a possible merger. Various
discussions have taken place. The final outcome is a merger
between Telia and Sonera. See Chapter 2.4.
The first telcos were all private, but with a mix of var-
ious corporate forms. Most telcos were co-operatives, typ-
ically with one share giving the right to one line. All co-
operatives were open to new customers. Anybody wanting
a phone could join by buying a share. New shares were
available on a continuous basis.
In most other countries the government decided either
not to grant licences to private operators, or at an early
stage took over the existing few and small telephone oper-
ators and created a state owned monopoly.
The shares were rather expensive, in the order of euro
(or USD) 500 - 1000 (1990’s level). The co-operative form
was appropriate for growing companies in a cash-strapped
economy, generating sufficient funds needed for invest-
ments. Another important source of funds was taxation.
Investments could be depreciated quickly, allowing rein-
vestment without profit tax.
The co-operative structure also means that co-opera-
tives did not aim at maximising profit and distributing
dividends, they instead applied lower tariffs. The struc-
ture was self-regulatory.
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Perhaps the most significant move was to participate
in third generation licence auctions and other licensing
competitions in several European countries. Sonera and
its partners did win one of the German licences. Sonera
also won stakes in licences in some other countries, at
substantially lower prices.
The outcome of the auctions is well known: the win-
ning operators generally ran into financial difficulties when
the world-wide telecom sector recession slowed down sector
growth and postponed introduction of 3G technology and
services. Sonera is no exception.
Sonera and its partners entered Germany, trying to cap-
ture a share of the present GSM market, deemed to be
needed for a successful start of 3G business. The attempt
failed and the German GSM joint venture (Quam) has been
closed down. It is difficult to enter a mobile market from
scratch, competing with several established operators. Telia
experienced the same difficulty in Finland.
Elisa runs the second largest mobile operator in Esto-
nia, which turned profitable in 2001. Since 1998 Elisa
has also invested significant amounts in stakes in city
carriers in Germany, to the extent that Elisa’s German sub-
sidiary is the largest city carrier group in Germany. The
German business is so far deep in the red, but Elisa ex-
pects it to turn profitable in 2003.
Jippii also entered a number of countries as Internet
and mobile service provider, partially with own backbone
network. The business turned out to be non-profitable and
Jippii is withdrawing from international markets except
for mobile entertainment.
The New Finnet companies, so far, have never tried
participating in the operator business abroad.
2.5 Telia-Sonera merger
This report describes general telecommunications policy,
and does not focus on state ownership policy. The status
of this chapter is of early October 2002.
Over the years the Finnish Government has been dis-
cussing various co-operation possibilities with major tele-
communications operators, including a full merger option.
The financial crisis of Sonera (see Chapter 2.6) speeded
up merger talks.
The final outcome is an agreement on a merger with
Swedish Telia. The terms and conditions for the merger
are not finalised (status early October 2002), and the fi-
nal decisions (company shareholder meetings) are not yet
made. The merger is also pending approval from national
competition authorities and the EU. One of the conditions
for approval is that Telia sells its mobile business in Fin-
land. This sale is on-going but not yet completed.
One of the important actions on the Sonera side be-
fore the merger was to fully write-down the value of the
German 3G licence (euro 3600 million). The action has
caused considerable discussion on the decision process
that approve participation in the auctions, and a search
for responsible persons. Because the Government still has
a majority stake in Sonera, the discussion extended to
Government approval processes and persons and political
responsibility. The discussion is still on-going in the Par-
liament.
2.6 Finnish operators abroad
Sonera started an aggressive expansion abroad in the
1990’s, mainly in mobile operations. Major investments
have been various joint ventures in the Baltics, Turkey,
Lebanon, Hungary and Russia. Some of these joint ven-
tures have made investments elsewhere. Most of these
were profitable until recent years. Sonera also acquired a
stake in two US mobile operators, subsequently sold to
Deutsche Telecom.
During the “dot.com boom” Sonera also initiated ma-
jor efforts aiming at global markets in mobile transaction
security and mobile Internet applications. These efforts
were not profitable.
14
7 Ericsson and Siemens had local switching manufacturing plants in Finland, as well as equipment design. In recent years mobile equipment design has been the focus, taking advantage of
Finland’s forerunner status in mobile usage. A number of other international information and communications technology (ICT) manufacturers have established design units in Finland, for the
same reason.
8 www.hexgroup.com. See also Chapter 5.
Table 7.
Breakdown of FICORA’s revenues in 2001
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME FROM FEE-CHARGING OPERATIONS IN 2001 EURO
Radio transmitter licence fees 4,741,168
Spectrum fees 5,148,101
Telecommunications network numbering fees 3,340,283
Internet domain name fees 828,764
Other fees 1,033,841
Postal operation supervision fees 843,841
Refund from the State Television and Radio Fund 10,122,916
Total 26,058,915
Source: www.ficora.fi
2.8 Policy and regulatory bodies
The Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications is
the policy making body, but, by law, it also has regulatory
tasks. The Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority
FICORA is the regulator. See Figure 3 and Chapter 4.11.
The decision power of FICORA is vested with the Chief
Executive Officer, appointed by the Minister. Until 2001
FICORA had a board with representatives from the indus-
try and users. The board decided on budgets, operational
and financial plans, general development of FICORA, sig-
nificant sector development plans, technical regulations
and general licence conditions.
FICORA may appoint advisory committees, and had
appointed five advisory committees by the end of 2001.
FICORA interacts closely with competition and consumer
authorities and with the industry, as well as with relevant
international organisations. It maintains a comprehensive
Internet site, in Finnish and Swedish (official languages)
and English, as well as publishes periodicals and runs
seminars.
A breakdown of the revenues is shown in Table 7.
At the end of 2001, FICORA employed 220 perma-
nent staff, and in addition about 20 temporary staff. FIC-
ORA’s revenues in 2001 were euro 26 million, and the
profit euro 1.5 million.
2.7 Vendor competition
The Finnish telecommunications sector has always been
open for competition between manufacturers. The open
competition, based on common standards (see Chapter
3.9) was not common elsewhere in Europe. Most coun-
tries had protected markets, with national manufacturers.
The outcome elsewhere was that manufacturers did not
need to compete.
Over time most European telecommunications manu-
facturers have been active in Finland. Some have been
established more or less permanently, some withdrew
quickly from the competitive market. Some manufactur-
ers stated publicly that Finland was a test field: if it works
in Finland with tens of operators, then it is safe for world-
wide deliveries.
The present Finnish champion Nokia had to enter a
fully competitive market with established competitors7.
Nokia started with cables, continued with transmission
equipment, further with switching, mobile network equip-
ment and mobile handsets. Nokia entered the market when
digital technology made its breakthrough, which offered a
green-field window of opportunity world-wide. Nokia did
not have the burden of backwards compatibility with own
old analogue equipment. The Nokia success is recognised
world-wide.
In particular the Finnish mobile success has created a
huge amount of start-ups and also several success stories
in the sector. This “communications cluster” is still de-
veloping, even if the telecommunications recession ham-
pers growth. 30+ cluster companies are listed on the Hel-
sinki stock exchange8.
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After 1987 the legislation has been amended several times,
almost annually. The above table does not include amend-
ments. Some amendments have been significant, e.g.
Sonera ‘s special rights were repealed and its status was
changed to a normal licensed operator in 1990.
The Communications Market law I includes the essen-
tial elements of convergence, including the policy of tech-
nology neutrality. There is no distinction between networks
built for traditional telecommunications, cable television
and terrestrial television, except for frequency licensing.
All these networks can be used for any service. Broadcast-
ing contents does have special legislation regarding con-
tents, but it is separate from networks. Perhaps the most
important new feature is that Internet services can now be
delivered using cable television and (later) digital terres-
trial television.
SMP status can be imposed on operators that have
Significant Market Power in relevant markets, including
telecommunications and broadcasting.
Source:Telecommunications statistics 2002
Figure 3.
Structure of Finnish telecommunications administration.
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME FROM FEE-CHARGING OPERATIONS IN 2001
SERVICE PROVIDES ISP’S CONTENT CREATORS
NETWORK OPERATORS MANUFACTURES SUPPORT PROVIDERS
MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS FICORA
Service
provider
notifications
Network
operator
notifications
Mobile
operator
licences
Control & supervision
Numbering
Frequency licences
Standardisation
Type approvals
MONITORING AND LINE OF ACTION
2.9 Legislation
The Finnish primary telecommunications legislation has evolved in the following main steps:
Table 8.
Development of primary communications legislation
YEAR LAW DESCRIPTION
1886 Telephone Declaration The Finnish senate was empowered to issue licences for installation of telephone lines, no monopoly  mentioned
1919 Telegraph law Government monopoly to provide telegraph service
1987 Telecommunications law Competing licences possible, licence granted based on political discretion. Initially Sonera had by law
right to provide service, other operators needed a licence
1997 Telecommunications market law Public mobile telecommunications needs a licence, tendering mandatory, all other telecommunications is either
subject to notification or fully liberalised, obligations to offer services and lease lines to other operators,
accounting separation of networks and services, meets EU directives, interface to competition legislation
2002 Communications market law I All communications networks (also broadcasting except content) in the same law (convergence)
2003 Communications market law II (under preparation) Meets the proposed new EU framework
16
that true competition would create better solutions for the
users than a regulator driven approach.
When Finland joined the EU in 1995, it was required
to amend its legislation to correspond to the EU princi-
ples. No major changes were needed, as Finland already
had implemented many liberal features that were only in
the planning stage in the EU.
After joining the EU, the Commission intervened a few
times in the Finnish telecommunications sector. Two main
cases were:
• unbundling of ownership and customer contract
(see Chapter 3.4), and
• enforcement of the EU principles for interconnection
(see Chapters 3.7 and 4.4).
In both cases user charges increased.
Other intervention cases have been:
• operator pre-selection for local calls and calls
to mobile networks; and
• verification of cost accounts of SMP operators.
Both have been duly implemented. Both concepts have
been designed for one-incumbent countries.
The Finnish authorities were reluctant to implement
operator pre-selection for local calls and calls to mobile
operators, arguing that routing calls through alternative
operators would only increase cost. Entrants have lobbied
strongly for such pre-selection, and the EU intervened.
Operator pre-selection has been mandated (technically
available) from September 2001. All local operators with
Significant Market Power had made pre-selection availa-
ble in their networks.
In October 2002 FICORA did not know about any op-
erator, entrant or older, using such pre-selection for rout-
ing local calls and calls to mobile networks via alternative
operators.
Verification of cost accounts is also implemented. Tak-
ing into account the number of local fixed SMP operators
in Finland, the regulatory burden for the small operators
as well as the regulator is significant. The regulator has a
similar burden for each operator independent of size. A
distribution of revenue of the local SMP operators is shown
in Figure 4.
2.10 Finland and the EU
The Finnish Telecommunications Act of 1987 was draft-
ed at the same time as the Commission’s Telecommunica-
tions Green Paper of 1987. While Finland was a member
of EFTA and not a member of the EEC, some contacts
were established during the drafting of the two papers.
The Finnish starting point was different from virtually
all other countries in the present EU (see Chapter 3). Fin-
land had a long history of a multi-operator market, with
large private ownership, while most other countries had
state owned monopoly operators. The EU as well as Fin-
land aimed at increased competition to the benefit of us-
ers. Many of the concepts and principles were identical or
similar. Both implemented immediate liberalisation of ter-
minal equipment. Separation of operation and regulation
was adopted in both. Interconnection was a century-old
tradition in Finland, and a necessary new feature in other
countries. Both aimed at, and participated in, creation of
common European standards.
However, in terms of liberalising (opening for competi-
tion), the speed and the routes were different. The Finn-
ish choice was to liberalise simply by removing competi-
tion barriers established by licences. The main tool was
facilities competition, with parallel (overlay) networks. No
exclusivity was specifically included, but competitive li-
cences were to be granted in stages. Full liberalisation
was implemented in 1994 in Finland, in 1998 in the EU.
The EU approach was essentially based on (tempo-
rary) exclusive rights for the incumbents to provide infra-
structure. That infrastructure should then be available to
service providers through the Open Network Provision con-
cept, with slower liberalisation of networks. The idea was
based on one shared main network. Full liberalisation was
implemented in 1998, with later deadlines for some other
countries. Finland stressed facilities competition.
The Finnish approach was strictly technology neutral,
with no official preference for any technology. Users may
choose between available services, all of them to be pro-
vided at commercial terms and conditions. The EU ap-
proach was more biased, through the Universal Service
approach, favouring fixed telephony, and some exclusive
rights for incumbent operators.
Finland also chose a more light-handed regulation than
the EU. The Finnish approach was based on the belief
17
SMP obligations have been imposed on Finnish local fixed
operators to ensure that each inhabitant has the right to
get a connection from at least one operator which does
not have the right to deny the request. The purpose is to
ensure service to the entire population. Independent of
SMP obligations, the smallest operators will anyway be
forced out of business (merged) if they are not reasonably
competitive.
Because EU’s SMP rules do not distinguish between
operators of different size, all SMP rules apply equally to
an euro 0.6 million, 3 staff, operator and an euro 1000+
million, 10,000+ staff, operator.
Figure 4.
Annual gross revenue (2001)
of local fixed operators with SMP
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isons use that kind of analysis because it is appropriate
for almost all other countries, but, unfortunately, it forces
Finland into an inappropriate model.
Directives and legislation based on a one incumbent
structure are not necessarily suitable for Finland. E.g. the
SMP (Significant Market Power) concept is designed for
countries with one large incumbent. The design of the
SMP concept forces Finland to also apply the rules to the
smallest telcos, which have some 1500 subscribers and 3
- 10 staff. Such approaches are commonly seen as obsta-
cles for the telecommunications sector moving towards a
normal competitive market. They also mean that Finland
is not allowed to be a forerunner, possibly providing valu-
able experience for other countries.
This chapter describes the main structural features in Fin-
land, and the impact of these features. Most of the im-
pact is due to two basic features:
• multi-operator structure, no incumbent; and
• co-operatives in the past.
3.1 Multi-operator structure
In most other countries the state owned incumbent had
 a unique status before liberalisation:
• no competition;
• no risk of take-over (competition-like pressure);
• strong political protection (state ownership);
• political tariff setting, with little relation
to underlying cost;
• in some cases used as a government cash cow;
• mixed political and business interests; and
• little cost control.
Finland never had one single incumbent. Until 1994 Fin-
land had regional fixed local monopolies, each of them
having the sole licence for that particular area. The areas
had evolved over time as a result of creation of new telcos
and mergers. Sonera had by law the obligation to offer
services in areas where private telcos did not have a li-
cence.
The regional monopolies did not have the same pro-
tection as monopolies in other countries. A competition-
like pressure existed in two ways:
• benchmark competition with other operators
in terms of price and quality; and
• continuous take-over threat.
Sonera built the first automated national mobile networks
in Finland. The first significant ones were NMT 450 (1982)
and NMT 900 (1986). Competition was introduced in
1990 when two licences were granted for GSM, one for
each of the two camps, to Sonera and Finnet.
Because Finland never had a true incumbent, interna-
tional reports and analyses that are based on comparison
of incumbents and entrants give an inaccurate picture of
the Finnish situation. Nevertheless most country compar-
3 Finland has always had
a multi-operator market
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3.2 Co-operatives
The co-operative structure means bundling of ownership
and user status: users have to buy a share in the co-oper-
ative for each line. Users are therefore also owners. Most
private telcos were co-operatives in the 1990’s, but many
large telcos have since been converted to normal limited
liability companies.
The co-operative structure causes a number of differ-
ences compared to normal commercial entities. Because
users are owners and for example appoint the Board of
Directors, user charges are set to cover costs only (price
ceiling). Usually no dividend is distributed. Dividends
would mean that users pay higher charges and receive the
higher charges back in return as dividends (after tax de-
duction) which is not sensible. This corporate culture of
not maximising revenue has a very strong impact, which is
difficult to explain. It also contributed to pride in provid-
ing services also to non-profitable areas within each former
licence area (now traditional area). Some operators charged
higher fees for remote areas, but usually not the full cost
to permanent residences.
Most co-operatives are less keen on expanding outside
their own traditional areas than normal companies. How-
ever, the telcos did expand into new services within their
traditional areas. Major new local services were cable tel-
evision and various forms of data transmission.
Country-wide services such as mobile telephony, long
distance telephony and some data communications serv-
ices were implemented using joint ventures (e.g. Radi-
olinja, DNA). The local telcos invested in networks, and
leased network capacity to these joint ventures, usually at
a good price.
A hostile take-over of a true co-operative is impossi-
ble. On the other hand, if the user-owners are not satis-
fied with the management, they may decide on a merger
with a neighbour which has better management. It is a
competitive-like pressure on management. This kind of
pressure has existed from the very beginning.
The telcos co-operated using associations and joint
companies for technical assistance, training, joint procure-
ment, consulting, etc.
The former Finnish taxation system favoured invest-
ments. The device was fast depreciation of investments.
The present depreciation rules are more neutral and cor-
respond to normal usage time.
3.3 Easy to introduce
effective competition
Due to the multi-operator structure and the two camps,
Finland had no difficulties in introducing effective com-
petition. The only action needed was to remove the obsta-
cles for operators to compete, i.e. extend the licences to
cover the competitors’ former licence areas and former
monopoly services.
Some facilities-based competition was already intro-
duced in the mid 1980’s, for data communications that
was not covered by the outdated telephone legislation from
1886. Sonera claimed exclusivity for telefax and data serv-
ices. The telcos offered telefax services and interconnected
their backbone networks for data services, and could thus
easily cover most of the corporate data communications
market. This caused a bitter fight and legal actions. The
outcome of the legal actions was that telefax and data com-
munications were not covered by the outdated legislation.
The first major competitive licensing was to grant GSM
licences to the two camps in 1990. The outcome was good:
Finland soon became the world leader in mobile penetra-
tion. Sonera had a previous NMT service, but the Finnet
camp was an entrant in mobile. Sonera has been able to
retain its position as market leader in mobile services.
The multi-operator structure with two camps resulted
in facilities competition. Sonera implemented its own
mobile network covering the Finnet camp areas. The tel-
cos agreed on how to cover the areas in which Sonera was
the traditional local fixed operator. Both camps used the
underlying backbone networks for all their different serv-
ices, in particular also for data services and corporate serv-
ices.
After some cautious liberalisation up to 1993, full
competition in fixed telephony was introduced in 1994.
The changes in market share in national and international
long distance services were impressive. Within a few
months the Finnet camp achieved a 50+ percent market
share in domestic long distance services. See Figure 5.
The Finnet success in international traffic was smaller
(20 % in 1995). All new entrants were much less suc-
cessful. The most successful entrant was Telia (its prede-
cessor Telivo).
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Numbering
When introducing competition in national and international
telephony the user should in principle select operator or
leave the selection to the operator. Many different arrange-
ments can be done. The starting point in Finland was:
• some old switches had restricted functionality and
limitations in number length, thus simultaneous use
of operator selection code and international access
code was not possible during 1994 - 1996 until old
switches were replaced; and
• liberalisation in 1994 was co-ordinated with a major
numbering reform in 1996, including introduction of
“0” as long distance access code (escape code) and
“00” as international access code9.
The regulatory decision was that operator access codes were
defined differently for national and international traffic.
The numbering change increased the size of the local
call areas and related numbering areas from an average of
4400 sq km to 30,000 sq km. In Finland numbering and
call charging are paired. The change was from 78 local
call areas (each with its own area code) to 12 (again each
with its own numbering code). This change reduced the
national long distance market by roughly 50 %, see Fig-
ure 5. The ultimate step, postalised tariffs (the entire coun-
try as one local call area), is yet to be seen.
National long distance operator selection was done
either using pre-selection (setting in the switch) or call-
by-call selection10 (including override of pre-selection).
Calls with no operator selection were distributed between
operators in relation to properly selected calls. The proce-
dure did not automatically favour the previous operator.
For international calls the international access code
before liberalisation was 990 (the code corresponds to
the pan-European access code 00). Sonera retained the
old code 990 as combined international operator selec-
tion and international access code, other operators were
assigned new codes (e.g. Finnet 999 and Telia 994). This
arrangement meant that users who continued to use the
old code automatically used Sonera. All international calls
had to use one or the other international code. Only after
9 “9” was commissioned as the long distance access code in Finland in 1958 when automatic long distance telephony was introduced. “990” was introduced later as international access code.
At that time Sonera was the sole long distance operator.
10 Operator codes for main operators were Sonera 101, Finnet 109, Telia 1041.
The Government also tried to introduce competition
on the local level, e.g. by mandating lease of access loops
and loop sharing. The outcome is not impressive. The main
results are achieved in corporate services, mainly using
competitive facilities (optical fibre and microwave links)
built for the purpose to major customer sites. Facilities
competition appears not to be realistic for residential cus-
tomers and small enterprises. Lease of loops appears to
remain a marginal method.
The four main underlying reasons for the different out-
come in national and international market changes were
• numbering;
• tariffs;
• the relevant subscriber base; and
• marketing.
Interconnection was not an issue as it was a century-old
tradition.
Figure 5.
National long-distance call revenue
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introduction of the pan-European code 00 calls interna-
tional calls without operator selection were possible, and
operator pre-selection relevant.
From a user point if view a change of operator access
code (from 990 to 99X) would have required re-program-
ming of international calls in handsets, dialling machines,
fax machines, PABX abbreviated dialling settings, etc.
Many users who did not care that much about operator
selection simply continued to dial 990 and thus, perhaps
unintentionally, chose Sonera.
For mobile users the GSM standard allows using “+”
instead of international access or operator selection code.
Using “+” means that operator choice is left to the mobile
operator unless a pre-selection is done in the mobile switch.
For roaming convenience many users programme their
handset using “+”, which means that “alternative” inter-
national operators are in an awkward position.
The impact of numbering on market share appears to
be significant. An exact assessment of the magnitude is
not possible.
Tariffs
At the time for liberalisation of international telephony,
mobile operators did not charge for access (the national
part of the outgoing international call), the international
charge included mobile access. This was possible because
of the vertically integrated operator structure and most
calls used the same camp’s international operator. Be-
cause fixed access was charged (most calls used an inter-
national operator from another camp), international calls
from a mobile phone were cheaper than from a fixed phone.
Mobile access charges were mandated later on, normalis-
ing the situation so that international calls were cheaper
from fixed telephones.11
Subscriber base
For national long distance traffic the underlying relevant
subscriber base was fixed telephony. Mobile services al-
ready included national long distance, as mobile services
in Finland (as well as most of Western Europe) were post-
alised: one call charge for the entire country. The Finnet
companies had about three times the number of subscrib-
ers of Sonera.
For international calls the underlying relevant subscrib-
er base included fixed and mobile telephone users. The
first mobile users were business users; thus mobile users
used international traffic above average. Sonera was much
stronger in mobile.
Marketing
National long distance telephony was liberalised in Janu-
ary 1994. International telephony was liberalised later, in
March 1994. The Finnet companies conducted a strong
marketing campaign, including direct contacts with all
major customers. Sonera chose to have a more traditional
campaign, based more on advertising.
Summary and lessons
As a whole the changes in market share for international
and national subsectors were exceptionally large compared
to other countries. It is not possible to analyse the impact
of the various reasons. Regulatory tools (read: numbering)
can be intentionally used to either offer neutral or biased
business possibilities. However, a precondition is that the
regulator understands the power of the various tools.
Finnet as well as Telia had their own existing back-
bone networks, which were valuable assets in the imple-
mentation of the national long distance service.
Other entrants in long distance services were much
less successful, due to the reasons described above.
An important conclusion is also that it does not ap-
pear to be realistic to create competition in the residen-
tial fixed telephony market using regulatory tools. Overlay
networks are not viable, and sharing networks with the
main operator in the respective area is not a properly work-
ing alternative. The problems are price related but also to
a large extent non-price issues. See also Chapter 4.12.
11 It is important to understand the different Finnish retail call charging system and the different interconnection regime. See Chapters 3.6 and 3.7. The Finnish international call charge
does not include the outgoing national fixed local call segment or outgoing mobile call segment, both are charged separately to the calling subscriber.
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Source: Telecommunications Statistics. 1 means cheapest
Table 9.
Finland’s position in residential fixed and mobile
telephony basket comparison covering EU and OECD
countries
YEAR POSITION IN COMPARISON
Fixed (EU) Mobile (OECD)
1996 4 2
1997 2 3
1998 1 4
1999 2 1
2000 2 3
2001 2 2
2002 4 1
3.4 Impact of co-operative
company form on user charges
The co-operative company form gave a strong say to resi-
dential customers. The result was uniform charges (no bulk
discount) for all customers. A uniform charge acts as a
subsidy mechanism from corporate customers to residen-
tial customers.
The requirement to subscribe to a share for each line
means that the initial connection fee is high, typically of
the order of euro (or USD) 500 - 1000. On the other hand,
shares can be sold and thus the user can get his money
back if he finds another user. A removal charge has to be
paid to remove the connection to another location, but
the removal charge is significantly lower than the share
price. During present slow or no growth, shares are not
that easy to sell. In 2001 the number of fixed connec-
tions was already slowly decreasing.
In return for the high price for a share the user gets a
lower annual rental than a non-owner rental (discounts
vary, at present of the order of euro 50 - 100 / year). Over
the years the return on invested capital has varied with
market interest rates, but it has usually been higher than
a long term bank account.
This system worked very well during the monopoly pe-
riod with fast growth, until the 1980’s. The system en-
sured funds for expansion of the network even during pe-
riods when access to capital such as bank loans was scarce
(still significant in the 1970’s). In present years funds are
available, and the original reason is no longer valid.
Telcos also have alternative subscription baskets, with
a more normal connection fee (of the order of euro 200)
and higher rental, but no ownership power. The connec-
tion fee may or may not be transferable to another person.
Call charges are the same as for user-owners.
EU competition policies did not accept the bundling of
ownership and the customer position, with owner discounts.
The EU intervened, which resulted in that the share and
the line were, or will be, unbundled. The co-operatives will
be converted into normal limited liability companies. User-
owners can sell the shares if they wish while still retaining
their telephone connection. Unbundling also means that
the owner discount on annual rental is removed, i.e. user
charges will increase. Several major telcos have already
implemented this arrangement, and other telcos will fol-
low. The co-operative company form is likely to disappear.
One outcome of the unbundling of shares and connec-
tions is that a take-over is much easier, as can be seen
from the experience of the first listed companies. A number
of the companies have taken various actions against the
threat of take-over.
3.5 Cost based tariffs
All private companies were financially independent from
the outset. None of the local telcos received any subsidy
from long distance or international revenue. See also Chap-
ters 3.6 and 3.7. Thus charges were automatically cost
based. Because the private telcos were mainly co-opera-
tives (one line for one share), the user-owners never ac-
cepted overcharging. Charges were not below cost, as such
charges would quickly have resulted in bankruptcy.
The only major exception to cost based tariffs was Son-
era until the early 1990’s. Sonera could cross-subsidise
from long distance and international revenue to its own
local services. The subsidies vanished in the early 1990’s
when competition was introduced. Sonera had to cut the
cost of local services, increase rentals and reduce long
distance and international tariffs to competitive levels.
Finland has performed rather well in comparison of
user costs. One comparison is shown in Table 9. The table
shows that Finland is usually in the top three.
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mally the operator in charge of the first segments invoices
the entire call. See also Chapter 3.8.
The following figures present Finnish call charges when
more than one operator is involved. Please note the distinc-
tion between local call charge (covering both local segments
in a national long distance call) and local network charge
(covering only local segment 1). The difference was an out-
come of the EU intervention in interconnection (see Chap-
ter 3.7). Segment means network segment.
The Figures 6 - 10 beside present only the most com-
mon retail prices. Other traffic cases (e.g. premium rate
services) are also included in the system in a correspond-
ing way.
No call charges are applied for incoming calls, except
for call forwarding and international roaming, which are
not included in the above cases.
Perhaps the most important feature in the Finnish seg-
ment pricing is that when an operator changes tariffs, such
changes are automatically, and fully, reflected in retail
prices, because the prices are user charges.
Interconnection charges are not automatically reflected
in retail prices. Example:
The fixed operator sets a price for fixed to mobile calls,
the same for any mobile operator. When one mobile
operator lowers its termination charge (interconnec-
tion charge), the fixed operator does not lower the
retail price but bags the difference itself. There is no
incentive whatsoever for the mobile operator to com-
pete with lower interconnection charges unless these
lower charges are fully reflected in retail charges. Real
price competition is in the retail market. This can be
understood so that end-to-end pricing partially pre-
vents real price competition, as terminating operators
have no power over retail prices.
The planned mobile number portability will perhaps
blur the main concept that the caller can determine the
call charge based on the called number. Users would not
anymore know the price of the call.
3.6 Different call retail pricing
substituting interconnection
charges
Finnish telephone call retail pricing is different from vir-
tually all other countries. It is rather complicated and not
always easy to understand for foreigners. It is, however,
necessary to understand the structure in order to have a
good understanding of Finnish telecommunications. The
usual trend in international comparisons is that Finnish
mobile retail prices e.g. for fixed to mobile calls are said
to be termination charges (interconnection charges) with-
out even mentioning the difference, which is wrong. This
is done because other countries have termination charg-
es, not retail charges.
The description below includes some historic develop-
ment.
The main principle in all other countries is end-to-end
pricing. One operator decides the price for the entire call,
end-to-end. This operator then buys the other call seg-
ments from relevant operators, and pays interconnection
charges to these other operators.
Finnish retail call charges (with more than one opera-
tor involved) are mainly based on segment pricing. The
original reason for segment pricing was the duopoly struc-
ture in the sector, with independent local operators and
Sonera as the sole long distance operator, with part of the
local market. Neither party accepted the other to have
power to influence the retail call price of the other party.
Thus a structure was created in which both parties had
the power to set and charge their own retail prices.
The exceptions from this general segment pricing rule
are
• local calls with more than one operator involved;
• mobile to mobile; and
• mobile to fixed.
In these cases end-to-end prices are applied and termina-
tion charges paid to terminating operators.
Charging was technically implemented using charging
pulses. Monitoring such pulses was technically possible
even in old analogue switching technology. Customer charg-
ing was based on total number of pulses, without distin-
guishing between various call types or call segments. Nor-
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Figure 6.
National long distance call
local segment 1 long distance segment local segment 2
Retail call charge until April 1999: local call charge + long
distance call charge. Local call charge covered both local
segments. Long distance call charge covered only long distance
segment.
Retail charge from May 1999: local network charge + long
distance call charge.
Local network charge covers local segment 1.
Long distance call charge covers long distance segment + local
segment 2.
Figure 7.
Outgoing international call
local segment 1 long distance segment international segment
Retail call charge: local call charge + international call
charge (until April 1999) or local network charge +
international call charge (from May 1999 onwards).
Local call charge or local network charge covers local
segment 1.
International call charge covers long distance segment
+ international segment.
Outgoing calls from mobile networks: outgoing mobile
network call + international call charge.
Figure 8.
Fixed to mobile call
local segment 1 mobile segment
Retail call charge: local call charge + incoming mobile call
charge (until April 1999) or local network charge + incoming
mobile call charge (from May 1999 onwards).
Local call charge or local network charge covers local segment 1.
Incoming mobile call charge covers mobile segment and is
charged to the calling fixed user.
Figure 9.
Mobile to fixed call
mobile segment local segment 2
Retail call charge: outgoing mobile call charge (end-to end pricing).
Figure 10.
Mobile to mobile call
mobile segment 1 mobile segment 2
Retail call charge: outgoing mobile call charge
(end-to end pricing).
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12 For another description of Finnish interconnection please see Fixed Mobile Interconnection: The Finnish Case, http://www.itu.int/interconnect/workshop.
 Sonera    Finnet    Song
Figure 11.
Relative price level development of national long
distance call charges. Year 1994 is 100.
EU intervention was effective in May 1999.
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tance operator for the total of the originating minutes. Due to
the clearing-house concept, there was no need to separate
between destination local areas. The long distance operator
then paid the termination charges to the destination local
operator without separation by originating local areas or orig-
inating local operator.
The originating local operator charged a normal local
call charge, paid the termination charge and kept the bal-
ance. The local call charge was an automatic ceiling. The
local call charge was set within the more or less self-regu-
latory co-operative environment. See Chapter 3.5.
The system was simple and worked without regulatory
intervention. It was self-regulatory, as the termination charg-
es were paid from the local call charges. Termination charges
had to be set at about half the average local call charges.
Too high termination charges would have resulted in too
low revenue for originating local operators. The system still
maintained the principle of keeping local call retail prices
(covering outgoing segment + terminating segment) fully
separate from long distance segment prices.
However, the system was based upon (cost based) re-
tail charges and did not correspond to the EU principles
of operator specific cost based interconnection charges.
3.7 Long history
of interconnection 12
Finland has a century-long history of interconnection. In a
multi-operator environment interconnection is a necessi-
ty. The manual telephony period is not included in this
description.
The retail tariff structure (created in the mid 1950’s)
is described in Chapter 3.6.
Originally no termination charges were in use. Sender
keeps all was used for outgoing calls, the originating local
operator retained the entire local call charge. Incoming
local call segments were handled free of charge, for na-
tional as well as for international calls. The traffic was
reasonably balanced, originated and terminated call min-
utes were about equal. Arrangement for reliable monitor-
ing of traffic (number of calls and call minutes) would
have been expensive in analogue switching, part of which
was as old as from the 1920’s and 1930’s.
When mobile services became more important, the sit-
uation changed. Mobile traffic was not well balanced, in-
itially mobile was used significantly more for outgoing calls
than for incoming calls. Also other call types emerged such
as premium rate calls and toll-free calls. Termination charg-
es had to be introduced and sender keeps all had to be
abandoned. Digital switching technology was already widely
employed, easing such a change.
The solution was agreed between the operators without
regulatory intervention, and
was introduced in 1994.
The local call charge was
split into two parts, divided
between the originating and
terminating local segments.
The termination charge was
standardised, the same in
the entire country, and did
not differ between opera-
tors. The long distance op-
erators acted as clearing-
houses. The originating lo-
cal operator paid termina-
tion charges to the long dis-
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Figure 12.
Main features of call invoicing convention
local long distance local
segment 1 segment segment 2
The EU intervened, and required each local operator to
set its own termination charges based on its own cost.
Furthermore, the termination charges should be included
in the long distance charges and not in the originating
local segment charges.
The changes required by the EU were carried out. The
changes removed the self-regulatory feature (access + ter-
mination charges equal local call charge, a ceiling func-
tion). It blurred the boundaries between operators and their
charges. Interconnection charges as well as retail tariffs
were immediately increased, in some cases doubled. Reg-
ulatory intervention was needed. The situation, even after
the regulatory intervention, was an increase of retail tar-
iffs and an expectation that further intervention may be
necessary, possibly with repeated court cases so common
in other countries. See Figure 11.
3.8 Call invoicing convention
In an end-to-end charging regime no call invoicing con-
vention is used. In the Finnish segment charging regime
an invoicing convention is necessary. Setting call segment
charges independently does not mean that the operator
setting the charges also invoices the user.
The invoicing convention introduced when automatic
long distance calling was introduced (1957) was that the
originating local operator invoices the call charges on be-
half of all parties involved. The originating local operator
was responsible for any bad debts. In order to compensate
for invoicing cost, bad debts etc., the originating operator
retained an agreed portion (a few percent) of invoiced
amounts and forwarded the balance to the other operators
(long distance, international, mobile, etc.). This arrange-
ment means that customers receive one single invoice for
all telephone charges. See Figure 12.
This main rule still works in most cases. However, at
present long distance operators have the right to charge
their segment themselves if they agree to do so with the
customer. Direct invoicing is expensive, in particular for
low users, thus most operators using direct invoicing are
in the corporate services market. Also end-to-end charges
are at present possible.
Other call types are charged in the same way.
3.9 Common technical
standards
In connection with increased introduction of automatic
switching national technical standards were introduced in
1954, and published as a book. The book (commonly called
the Green book due to the cover colour) was widely used
by all technical management in all telcos. The technical
standards were based on ITU standards, applied to the
Finnish environment. The technical standards were repeat-
edly revised in line with technical development. Present
digital technology needs less, but different, technical
standards to the analogue technology.
The common technical standards offered a good foun-
dation to introduce competition between vendors for al-
most all network equipment, including switching. The
change of switching equipment vendor was not that com-
mon, as it required complete re-training of all installation
and maintenance staff. Changes did occur, usually in con-
nection to introduction of digital switching starting from
the late 1970’s.
Before liberalisation of terminal equipment in the mid
1980’s, telephone sets were manufactured in three facto-
ries in Finland. After liberalisation the number of vendors
increased, the variety of models improved and prices gen-
erally dropped. Similar development could be seen in the
PABX market.
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13 Many operators world-wide apply the lowest charges for calls within their own network. The cost for the mobile operator is highest for an own network call. The SIM card router is thus
designed based on a tariff anomaly, but it does provide a competitive solution.
14 Source: Vesa Kuusela: Puhelinpeittävyyden muutos Suomessa, Katsauksia 2000/3, Statistics Finland.
3.10 Innovative competition
Competition in telecommunications (in the modern sense)
started in the 1970’s, when Sonera started to build some
microwave links to major customer to bypass the local
networks of Finnet companies for data networks. It accel-
erated in 1985, when the Finnet companies created an
own network for corporate data services. No competition
would have been possible without each party having full
control of all network components.
Facilities competition was used from the outset, dif-
ferent from a number of other countries where the incum-
bent long had exclusive rights with regard to networks,
and other operators had to lease capacity from the incum-
bent. Use of fixed data services (leased lines and dedicat-
ed data networks) have been shrinking since about 1990.
Leased lines are still in use for corporate networks, e.g. as
described below. All operators have the option to build
own facilities, which increases the interest to provide leased
lines even to competing operators.
A number of innovative solutions have been created
for entrants competing with the previous monopolist in
each area. The other main camps are entrants when ex-
panding into the competitor’s area. Thus Sonera is an en-
trant in Finnet’s previous areas, and Finnet an entrant in
Sonera’s previous areas. New entrants are, of course, en-
trants everywhere.
The main solutions for arranging access facilities are:
• optical fibre or microwave connection
to sites of large customer;
• lease 2 Mbit/s line (or xDSL line, perhaps even dark
fibre) from competitors to sites of large customer;
• connect a SIM card router to the PABX or key
telephone system to connect the PABX or key
telephone system to one or more GSM networks.
The main access services (using the above facilities) are:
• direct connection (usually 2 Mbit/s) from PABXs to
mobile switches for bypassing the local operator’s
fixed telephony services and integrating the custom-
er’s mobile handsets and PABX (network) extensions;
• direct connection (usually 2 Mbit/s) from a PABXs to
IN (Intelligent Network nodes) for bypassing the local
operator’s fixed telephony services and connecting the
customer’s PABX to a virtual PABX network, including
call centre control;
• bypass the local telephone network (using SIM card
router) and utilise the lower call tariff within a GSM
network rather than using call charges into or out of a
GSM network13; and
• other similar by-pass functions.
These solutions are all common, even almost standard,
and examples of innovative solutions to by-pass the local
fixed access network. Competing with the fixed network
does not necessarily mean that an overlay fixed network is
the only solution, substituting solutions are sufficient.
These solutions have emerged as a result of market econ-
omy, when regulatory ex-ante decisions do not restrict ac-
ceptable or allowed solutions. With a strong regulatory
control, the above alternatives would perhaps not have
materialised to the extent they are in use today.
Alternatives for residential customers continue to be a
problem, in particular for Internet access. For voice use
mobile is taking over. See Chapter 3.11.
3.11 Mobile takes over voice
In the early 1990’s Sonera realised that mobile was the
only possibility for it to compete with the Finnet fixed te-
lephony. With several tariff baskets mobile started to be-
come the cheapest telephone for low users.
About one third of the Finnish households have aban-
doned fixed telephone lines and moved to mobile only. This
has happened over the last 10 - 12 years. Mobile telephones
are often the cheapest alternative for so called non-stabi-
lised households: students, one-person households, low
income households, unemployed, frequent residence mov-
ers, etc14. The two main underlying reasons are that mobile
rental (typically euro 40 - 45 / year) is much lower than
fixed rental (typically euro 120 - 160 / year), and the charge
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for moving a fixed connection to another location is quite
high (in the order of euro 100). A student may need to do
at least two such moves per year, which is a considerable
additional cost compared to a mobile connection. Also in
other countries mobile (usually pre-paid) has been the choice
of the poor, or his only possibility.
In 1990, 94 % of the households had a fixed tele-
phone, and 7 % a mobile. At that time households with a
mobile also had a fixed telephone. See Figure 13. Devel-
opment over the last few years is shown in Figure 14.
The figures show that a vast majority (90+ %) of Finn-
ish households have at least one mobile phone. The por-
tion of households relying on only fixed telephone has
dropped well below 10 %. Two thirds of the households
have both. A mere 2 % of households have no phone,
even if social service would finance a phone (fixed or mo-
bile) for many of the poorest if they need one.
A similar development can be seen in corporate use,
in particular in small enterprises.
Fixed telephony usage appears to change to data rath-
er than predominantly voice. Fixed telephony networks are
expected to remain the perhaps most important broad-
band access media for the foreseeable future, using xDSL
technology. Cable television networks cover only part of
households. Potential technology competitors appear to
be terrestrial digital television, wireless access, and pow-
er distribution networks.
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Figure 13.
Portion of households with at least
one fixed or mobile telephone
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Figure 14.
Portion of households with only fixed,
only mobile or with both types of telephones
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The above three-tier scale is rather coarse. A more de-
tailed scale could also be used.
The only country using the No regulation approach has
been New Zealand. The experience of the country is not
better than in countries with regulators. Even New Zea-
land is planning to introduce some degree of telecommu-
nications regulation.
Virtually all other countries have opted for some kind
of sector specific regulation. Such regulation is often in-
tended to be an interim type solution, to be decreased
over time when sufficient competition develops. However,
no significant decrease in regulation has been seen so far.
No regulation is the ultimate objective for most coun-
tries that have implemented liberalisation. Telecommuni-
cations should be similar to any other business and gov-
erned mainly or only by normal business practice and busi-
ness legislation, including competition legislation and
consumer protection legislation.
Light-handed regulation means that a regulator exists,
some regulation is in place as a last resort type function.
The regulator intervenes only when significant need arises.
The main rule is competition, even if not always ideal. The
4.1 Regulatory approaches
Regulation can be implemented in many different ways.
One important feature is regulatory approach in the sense
of how strong regulation is used. A scale could be the
following:
regulator is aware that regulatory intervention may help,
but in some cases may even worsen the situation. Light-
handed regulation is a “doctor” type policy. Light-handed
regulation may set a floor or a ceiling, but not both.
Light-handed regulation gives market forces the possi-
bility to work. For example interconnection agreements can
be made freely, also differing from generally accepted prac-
tice if the parties so agree. The regulator intervenes only
upon request. The business is mainly market-driven, not
regulator-driven, and reflects a belief in market economy.
Light-handed regulation is easier if a reasonable de-
gree of competition has been established. On the other
hand, light-handed regulation is not necessary weak, it
may be quite strong if operators misbehave.
The Finnish approach has so far essentially been more
light-handed regulation than in most other EU countries.
Heavy-handed regulation means that a powerful regula-
tor exists and directs the market using its power. Regula-
tion may specify the only allowed solution, and players do
not have the right to deviate from that. Deviations are not
allowed even if it would offer customers better terms and
conditions. The sector is to a large extent regulator-driven
rather than business-driven. Heavy-handed regulation is used
when policy makers do not believe in market economy.
Heavy-handed regulation often sets a floor and a ceiling.
The EU directives include a number of features that
could be described as heavy-handed regulation.
Heavy-handed regulation can be used in a market econ-
omy for certain details to ensure the desired result. Heavy-
handed regulation may also be needed when a former mo-
nopoly adopts a business culture significantly based on
unfair competition, disrespect for consumer rights, and
similar.
A good example of a regulatory change from heavy-
handed to light-handed is terminal equipment type ap-
proval. The stepwise change has been the following (not
all countries had all steps):
• operator-specific type approval, each operator had its
own (often very detailed) requirements and its own
laboratories, result: operator-specific types and
generally small markets;
• country-specific type approval, each country had its
own requirements and its own laboratories, result:
Table 10.
Regulatory approaches. Framework regulation means
standardisation, tariff structures, interconnection
principles, etc.
APPROACH DESCRIPTION
No regulation Reliance on competition legislation and courts, no sector-specific
regulation or regulatory body, no framework regulation or other
neutral system for assignment of scarce resources
Light-handed Regulation is used as a last resort, only when needed. Frameworkregu
lation exists as well as assignment of scarce resources. Regulation
usually provides a minimum set solution. Market forces (players) may
agree otherwise, exceeding the minimum. The regulator has the right
to intervene if necessary regulation
Heavy-handed Mandatory solutions. Market forces are not allowed to do otherwise,
regulation even if the solutions would be better for customers
4 Finnish policy is different
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country-specific types and country-wide markets;
• common European type approval, European
requirements (focussed on safety only), result:
Europe-wide market; and
• common European requirements, manufacturers’
declaration, result: Europe-wide market, but with less
bureaucracy.
The development has resulted in significantly improved
equipment supply and variety of equipment, with a simul-
taneous reduction of prices. Unbundling of connection and
first telephone set, where applied, has contributed to a
positive development. No significant degradation of qual-
ity or risk to networks has occurred.
Finland has used semi-heavy-handed regulation in
some cases. One example is mandatory unbundling of
mobile handsets and mobile services, different to many
other countries. Another is mandating lease of “last mile”
resources in the fixed network. Both have been consid-
ered necessary to avoid abuse. In particular, mandated
lease of unused capacity (xDSL band15) on existing fixed
subscriber lines was considered necessary to speed up
the provision of xDSL. Fixed operators appeared to be
unwilling to introduce xDSL alternatives, to promote dial-
up Internet access. The cases may also be understood as
framework regulation rather than heavy-handed regulation.
One of the disadvantages of in particular ex-post type
regulatory intervention is that regulatory decisions can be
challenged in courts. While such a possibility is necessary
in an orderly society, the outcome can be a series of almost
endless court cases and a lawyer-oriented business. Busi-
15 xDSL is a generic term for a family of Digital Subscriber Line technologies, used for high speed data transmission on copper pairs, in particular subscriber lines. The xDSL spectrum allows a
normal analogue telephony connection and a high speed data connection (usually Internet access) to be provided on one copper pair.
Figure 15.
Impact of regulatory tools depending on status of liberalisation
INCREASES COMPETITION LIBERALISATION STATUS DECREASES COMPETITION
Direction of impact Direction of impact
Network sharing obligation Co-location
Accounting separation
Cash-in auctioning of spectrum
Virtual operators
Unrestricted licensing Cable TV, Network sharing obligation
wireless Internet access Cash-in auctioning of
Ownership separation of telephone and cable TV networks Virtual operators
Number portability Co-location
More spectrum Restrictive licensing
Ban on network sharing Accounting separation
Monopoly
Services competition only,
virtual operators
(other EU)
Limited facilities competition
(other EU)
Strong facilities competition
(Finland)
ness management has to use significant time for court cas-
es, rather than for developing their business. Such signs
are also visible in Finland. The court cases are usually re-
lated to inter-operator relations, not to customer relations.
4.2 Impact of regulatory tools
Various policy and regulatory tools can be used for sector
control. The impact of such tools depends on the overall
situation in the relevant country. One possible view is pre-
sented in Figure 15.
Figure 15 illustrates the impact depending on the sta-
tus of liberalisation. E.g. network sharing and co-location
as well as promotion of virtual operators may be good tools
when moving from a monopoly to services competition,
i.e. in the first phases of liberalisation before facilities
competition has developed. The same tools may have a
negative impact on competition if applied to a situation
with existing facilities competition, in particular if facili-
ties competition is strong.
Figure 15 is intended to be a basis for discussion, as
well as the impact of various tools. The most important is
to realise that the impact can be different if the liberalisa-
tion status is different.
With three country-wide operator camps offering full
service, with about equal bargaining power, Finland may
be understood to have strong facilities competition. Most
other EU countries are either on a services competition or
limited facilities competition level.
33
4.3 Strong reliance
on market forces
The Finnish telecommunications policy relies strongly on
market forces rather than on regulatory intervention. Even
if competition is not ideal, with numerous players in each
relevant market, the policy has been to rely on competi-
tion and use regulatory intervention mainly as a last re-
sort. The power to use intervention is in many cases suffi-
cient, thus making its use unnecessary.
Whenever possible, Finnish policy makers and the reg-
ulator have intentionally avoided defining how competi-
tion should take place and which alternatives are “politi-
cally acceptable”. A technology neutral policy has been
applied.
One example is local fixed telephony for residential
customers. A regulatory definition would be that the only
acknowledged alternative is fixed telephone access from
another fixed operator, including fixed wireless access.
Such a decision would exclude e.g. mobile telephony as
an alternative, and most by-pass type solutions. While many
countries have made such decisions (usually as part of
Universal Service policies), Finland has avoided doing so.
Users have a choice between cost-based and otherwise
equally treated solutions. The policy maker does not make
the choice.
Country-wide PABX networks have become common,
with national numbering and local call charge to these
networks from anywhere in the country. This service is
usually implemented using IN (Intelligent Network) serv-
ices. It is also an example of facilities based competition.
The above examples are intended to show that regula-
tory decisions defining “politically acceptable” alterna-
tives may well exclude useful and competitive alternatives.
Market forces (manufacturers, operators, users) often de-
velop new solutions outside the scope of such regulatory
decisions. Regulation should not prevent such develop-
ment by mandating regulator-selected solutions or other-
wise neglecting different competing solutions.
4.4 Selective intervention
Selective regulatory intervention has been used at times
to ensure certain features. In the past such intervention
was often done so that the Ministry discussed informally
with the operators and stated that if the required actions
were not carried out it could even be possible that new
legislation would be enacted. Such discussions were of-
ten sufficient. At the time the Ministry could implement
such legislation as ministerial decisions. At present (after
the new Constitution) most such legislation has to be done
on a primary legislation level.
Many new initiatives have been implemented so that
the idea is discussed initially, and then a consultant is
contracted to elaborate the topic and create one or several
alternatives. The Ministry has also enhanced competition
e.g. by regularly publishing price comparisons, user cost
development and other relevant studies.
Some examples:
Interconnection of packet switching networks
Interconnection of packet switching networks was not im-
plemented voluntarily. The Ministry discussed the matter
with operators and stated that interconnection can be
mandated if necessary. Interconnection was subsequently
implemented without official obligations.
Interconnection of IP networks
Interconnection of IP networks was not implemented vol-
untarily. The Ministry discussed the matter with IP network
operators. No suitable interconnection standard was devel-
oped. The solution was to licence an interconnection oper-
ator and develop an interim standard, which subsequently
has developed into an international de facto standard.
Leasing xDSL spectrum on fixed subscriber lines
Telecom operators appeared to be slow in introducing xDSL
technology. They apparently preferred dial-up, a more prof-
itable service, and essential as voice telephony is moving
to mobile networks. Broadband is a key component in the
emerging Information Society. At the same time EU and
several other European countries discussed alternatives
to speed up xDSL provision.
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Lease of copper lines was mandated earlier. The fixed
operator had the possibility to supply xDSL on existing
subscriber lines, even if no loops were available to other
operators. The Finnish solution was to mandate lease of
xDSL spectrum on existing subscriber lines to other oper-
ators as well. Mandating spectrum also means minimising
the resource to be leased, even if such a lease has some
difficulties. The principle of leasing spectrum has subse-
quently been included in EU directives. Supply of xDSL is
now satisfactory.
The Ministry has also used its policy-making position
to initiate various projects for development of the Infor-
mation Society. Some of the projects have been related to
interconnection of various networks, development of com-
mon platforms and user interfaces etc. This type of devel-
opment work continues.
4.5 Limited price regulation
Price regulation has three different components:
• definition of tariff structure;
• definition of tariff setting principles; and
• regulation of individual tariffs.
The first two components are examples of light-handed reg-
ulation, while the third is closer to heavy-handed regula-
tion, even if e.g. price cap regulation is applied.
Tariff structure has several dimensions. Finnish local call
areas are defined as a regulatory decision. In 1996 the
number of local call areas was decreased from some 75 to
12. Local call charges are applied to calls within the local
call areas, and long distance charges to calls between the
areas (connection between numbering and tariff structure).
The decision can be understood as somewhat heavy-hand-
ed regulation with limited scope, but it does not prevent
operators from going further, towards postalised tariffs.
Tariffs have to be separated into connection charges,
rental charges and usage charges. This regulatory rule is
not perhaps worth much, as the relation between the charges
is the most important.
The main principles for tariff setting, including inter-
connection charges, are defined in Finland. They follow EU
principles of cost orientation. Bulk discounts are allowed.
Introduction of bulk discounts is a significant change from
the previous system with one tariff applied to all users, low
users and heavy users alike.
Finland does not regulate individual tariffs, with some
notable exceptions. Usually competition in the multi-oper-
ator structure works satisfactorily. The regulator has the
power to intervene.
Price regulation was used in connection with the EU
intervention regarding interconnection prices. The previous
self-regulatory mechanism vanished and interconnection
prices (access and termination charges) were increased, in
some cases doubled. Intervention was needed.
In line with the Finnish policy of minimising regulatory
intervention, the decision was to set a temporary ceiling for
local interconnection access and termination charges to 60
% of local call charges. After the expiry of the period no
formal limit for interconnection charges has been in force.
The operators have applied the expired temporary rule. The
regulator showed its powers, and that was sufficient to lim-
it abuse.
In the last years intervention has been used regarding
several interconnection charges, resulting in a decrease of
charges. Intervention has also been used on individual tar-
iffs for network capacity leased to service providers.
This type of regulation of inter-operator charges appears
to be the most disputed regulatory area, resulting in repeat-
ed court cases with appeals to upper court levels as high as
it is possible to go. The typical time from the first com-
plaint to the final court decision is several years. These
court cases leave aside the equally important non-price
aspects.
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4.6 Technology neutral
Finnish telecom policy makers have explicitly stressed that
they aim at technology neutral policy and regulation. The
market should decide on technology, not the policy maker
or regulator.
In the Finnish context, technology neutral regulation
means many different approaches:
• neutral regulatory fees (see Chapter 4.7);
• radio spectrum charges cover only administrative
cost of spectrum management (see Chapter 4.7);
• lack of strong Universal Service policy
(see Chapter 4.8); and
• no limitation on using any technology
(except scarce resources).
The technology neutral approach is emphasised in the new
legislation enacted in 2002. The legislation is common to
telecommunications and broadcasting networks, and does
not distinguish between different networks. Services may
be provided using any network.
A key difference between countries is the policy when
it is apparent that mobile may compete strongly with fixed
telecommunications. Some alternatives are presented in
Figure 16.
4.7 Neutral regulatory fees
Finland does not levy licence fees on telecommunications
operators; operating licences are free of charge. Mobile
operators get their operating licence free of charge, other
operators (including fixed) only notify the Ministry. All
operators do pay administrative charges for spectrum need-
ed, and for numbering capacity. These two charge types
are the main source of revenue for FICORA. The number-
ing charges will be partially replaced by supervision fees,
to extend charges to operators not using numbering.
The reason for not imposing any licence fee is that
telecommunications is considered normal business, not
subject to any special taxation.
Figure 16.
Alternative approaches to fixed-mobile competition
ACCEPT COMPETITION CASH IN ON MOBILE RESTRICT COMPETITION SUPPORT COMPETITION
MOBILE COMPETES WITH FIXED
TECHNOLOGY NEUTRAL
NO / LOW LICENCE FEES
ORGANISE LICENCE
AUCTIONS ON CASH
RECEIVER PAYS ASYMMETRIC
INTERCONNECTION
MORE SPECTRUM
MORE LICENCES
FINLAND
SWEDEN
UK
GERMANY
USA NONE
The figure is intended to be a basis for discussion.
The main purpose is to show that a number of different
approaches can be adopted to deal with emerging compe-
tition. The countries mentioned are examples only, other
countries could be added, as well as other approaches.
An approach supporting competition is not easily avail-
able on a country basis, as increased spectrum allocation
requires international agreement.
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16 The full text of the reasoned decision granting the 3G licences dated 16 March 1999 can be found on the Ministry’s web pages: http://www.mintc.fi
17 The public discussion on methods for selection of licensees has mentioned only auction (on highest licence fee) and beauty contest (with assessment of bidders) as alternatives. Also other
methods have been used: closed bids (Dutch auctions) on highest licence fee, closed bids on largest coverage, multi-criteria bidding with several clearly specified criteria. Selection based on
subjective assessment is more prone to court cases than selection based on clearly specified, measurable criteria.
Finland does not have a strong tradition of operators
going to court against almost each and every regulatory
decision. In such a culture a beauty contest type selec-
tion with assessment of bidders would not work, as as-
sessment includes subjective elements. Auctions signifi-
cantly lower the risk for complaints17.
During the period when several European countries
auctioned their 3G licences at astonishing prices, the Finn-
ish Government was strongly criticised for not cashing in
on the revenue that could be gained by selling the licenc-
es. The outcome of the auctions at astonishingly high prices
can be seen today, with the worsening of the world-wide
telecommunications crisis and the delay in the introduc-
tion of 3G networks and services, with the result that Eu-
rope now risks losing much of its leading position in mo-
bile communications.
4.8 Licensing policy
During the entire period since the first legislation was
enacted in 1886, anybody has had the possibility to apply
for a licence, at anytime. This is how the multi-operator
system was created. Groups of persons decided to create
a telco in the relevant city or village or other geographical
area. They applied for a licence, and usually got one. Even
competing licences could be applied for.
Exclusive or special rights have been included in pri-
mary legislation in two cases, when telegraph exclusivity
was granted to Sonera in 1919, and granting the State
exclusivity for radio broadcasting in 1926. The exclusivity
for radio (and partially television) broadcasting created a
perception that it is a public service. That perception is
difficult to combine with running telecommunications as
a business, when convergence merges the two.
Exclusivity was arranged by not granting competing
licences. Each local telco had a de facto exclusivity in its
own area. Sonera had a similar exclusivity in long dis-
tance, international and (analogue) cellular mobile com-
munications.
Finland was the first country to issue licences for third
generation (3G) mobile services. Also these operator li-
cences were issued free of charge, based on “beauty con-
test” selection criteria defined in law. The long term pur-
pose is that mobile data services should successfully com-
pete with fixed Internet access. Fixed Internet is a low
cost service due to low underlying cost, and a competitor
should not need to pay excess charges or tax type fees if it
is to be competitive. Mobile services are one component
of the Information Society, and should be promoted, not
punished. Government should avoid increasing the risk
level for any business.
The main reasons for the Finnish preference for admin-
istrative assignment of spectrum and beauty contest as the
selection method for operators are shown in Table 1116 .
Table 11.
Reasons for Finnish selection
of third generation mobile services
REASON RATIONALE
Technology Mobile telecommunications should compete on a level playing
neutral field with fixed services, future digital broadcasting
policy (convergence!), and other services, no tax type fees should be
levied only on some competing services
Large coverage The desired outcome is large geographical and population
coverage to ensure that service is available to those who wish
service
Selection criteria The desired outcome is provision of services. The correspond-
should correspond ing selection criteria should be supply of service, large
to desired outcome coverage, and resources for implementing the desired
outcome. Highest licence fee does not correspond to the
desired outcome and ensure service provision
Spectrum If spectrum is not sold, administrative assignment of
assignment spectrum allows for administrative reorganisation of spectrum,
can be reversed which has been done. Sold spectrum cannot easily be
rearranged. A working secondary market for spectrum
has not emerged anywhere
Government should High licence or spectrum fees mean an increased risk level for
not increase risk operators due to high initial cost for an uncertain business.
level for operators Generally the task of any government is to support smooth
can be reverseddevelopment rather than sudden changes
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In all cases the exclusivity granted to state entities
created a perception that certain services are - and should
be - reserved for Government. When such perceptions last
for generations, such perceptions are then significant hin-
drances for change. In local telephony no such perception
existed, due to the multi-operator system.
During the period until 1987 a few competing local
licences were granted. E.g. in 1931 a second local telco
licence was granted for the small city Loviisa. The new
entrant quickly forced the previous operator to withdraw.
Present facilities competition started in 1985. The
telcos built a country-wide digital network for data com-
munications, mainly using existing backbone facilities. Due
to the outdated legislation (from 1886!), data communi-
cations was not covered by telecommunications legisla-
tion, only by normal business legislation.
The 1987 law covered all telecommunications. Sales
and connection of type approved terminal equipment was
liberalised. All telecommunications needed a licence un-
less specifically exempted. Initially competing licences
were granted cautiously, with marginal competition im-
pact. Some of the licences even included ceilings on rev-
enue. At the time all telecommunications licences in Eu-
rope were granted using political discretion, and Finland
was no exception.
Initially all licences were individual licences, with in-
dividual terms and conditions in each licence. The terms
and conditions included in the licences were, however,
restricted to those that were different between similar li-
cences such as licence area, duration, etc18. Terms and
conditions common to similar licences were included in
common regulations. That concept simplified licensing and
ensured a level playing field. The tradition of common
technical standards was a natural foundation for such com-
mon regulations.
The main licensing steps liberalising the Finnish tele-
communications market are shown in Table 12.
Sonera prepared for the inevitable onset of competi-
tion by a complete reorganisation and reduction, by al-
most half, of its staff in 1991 - 1993. There were no
dismissals. The surplus staff were transferred to an engi-
neering subsidiary, retired or resigned voluntarily.
18 Finnish telecommunications licences were typically a few pages. One page licences were not uncommon. If needed, annexes were used (e.g. a map clarifying the licence area).
The largest step was taken in 1994 when long dis-
tance and international telecommunications was fully lib-
eralised, without political discretion in awarding licences.
The policy discussion before the decision focussed on how
large service disturbances would occur, in particular wheth-
er the viability of Sonera would be severely disturbed.
Source: Telecommunications statistics 1989 - 2002
Table 12.
Main licensing steps in liberalising the Finnish
telecommunications market
YEAR ACTION
1985 • Datatie (Finnet data network) started operation
without needing a licence
1988 • Datatie and Yritysverkot (a Sonera corporate services subsidiary)
were both granted country-wide licences
1990 • Sonera was granted a licence (special rights in
the legislation were repealed)
• two competing GSM 900 licences were awarded
• competing licences for corporate services were awarded
1991 • regional trunking licences were awarded
1992 • switched data communications was fully liberalised
(exempted from licensing)
1993 • limited competition in long distance and international
telecommunications was introduced
1994 • national and international long distance was fully liberalised
• the first service providers were licensed
1995 • competing GSM 1800 licences were awarded
1996 • operators were obliged to lease network capacity
to other operators
1997 • licensing was abolished and replaced with notification,
except for mobile licences
1998 • transborder telecommunications into Finland
was exempted from notification
• minor mobile communications were exempted from operator
licensing (e.g. trunking, paging), but frequency permits
were still needed
1999 • four nation-wide third generation mobile licences
were granted using beauty contest
• service providers were given rights to more flexible
tariff setting and invoicing
2000 • a third GSM 900 licence was granted
• xDSL spectrum leasing obligation was imposed
2001 - 02 • first convergence based licences granted, digital broadcasting
networks may be used for telecommunications (three television
and two radio broadcasting networks)
• cable television networks will be opened as access media
to any Internet service providers
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After the liberalisation the local telcos’ joint venture for
long distance services captured more than 50 % of the
national long-distance market in a short time, and a sig-
nificant portion of the international market. The financial
impact on Sonera was not serious. The importance of these
changes was reduced due to three simultaneous changes:
• price elasticity increased demand for competitive
services;
• overall fast growth, in particular in mobile (Sonera’s
emerging main business); and
• Sonera had prepared for competition through
a radical staff reduction in 1991.
Thus there was no significant hindrance for full liberalisa-
tion of the entire market. That was done in a 1996 law
amendment abolishing political discretion in awarding li-
cences. This was further eased in the 1997 Telecommu-
nications Market law. Except for public mobile networks,
telecommunications operators only need to formally noti-
fy the Ministry. Some minor mobile services are exempted
even from notification. After liberalisation in 1987 the
number of operators has grown quickly, see Table 13.
Despite the liberalised market, the structure has not
changed significantly in terms of operators. Previous ma-
jor players are still major players, even if the relations
have changed. The main change has been the growth in
mobile and data communications sectors and the stagna-
tion in fixed telephony.
As an outcome of the licensing policy, facilities com-
petition and parallel networks have developed for almost
all other sub-sectors except fixed telephony for residential
users and small and medium size enterprises. The Minis-
try has stated that it does not appear to be possible to
increase local fixed telephony competition using legisla-
tive and regulatory means.
Source: Telecommunications Statistics
Table 13.
Number of telecommunications operators in Finland
YEAR NUMBER OF OPERATORS
1990 57
1991 58
1992 59
1993 55
1994 60
1995 66
1999 120
2002 154
4.9 Some societal issues
Finland has no specific Universal Service obligations im-
posed on certain operators. Generally, Universal Service aims
at promoting the Information Society. Universal Service
policies usually deal with three specific issues:
• social component (everybody should have access,
at reasonable prices);
• regional balance (extend access
to the entire country); and
• cultural and educational promotion.
The Finnish approach to the social component of tele-
communications is that it is similar to any other social
needs, such as food, clothes, accommodation, health, etc.
All of these are more expensive than telecommunications.
Persons with normal income pay normal, commercial pric-
es. Low income persons may need financial support. Such
support is paid from tax funds. Relevant commodities and
services are in most cases procured from the private sec-
tor at market prices. There is no good reason why the pub-
lic sector should transfer financing of social obligations to
private enterprises, or even to state owned enterprises when
they work in a competitive environment.
The normal social administration is more competent
to assess the subsidy needs than any normal commercial
enterprise. The social administration can buy the needed
services for each case, using competitive procurement, in
the same way as any other social services.
A commercial entity has to apply “social” charges even
to the majority of users who could pay normal commercial
charges. There is no real possibility for a commercial com-
pany to hand-pick the needy, the daily work for a social
administration. Such social charges are a burden for the
company, and it has to cross-subsidise the social charges
from other services. Cross-subsidies are generally frowned
upon when assessing economic efficiency. A summary of
differences between tax based social services and cross-
subsidised Universal Service is shown in Table 14.
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A prerequisite for tax based social service is a reasonable
living standard and a working tax financed social service
system. In a poor country it may be questionable to ar-
range for subsidised telecommunications if food, health
and housing are not.
The regional service provision is historically good, even
if Finland is the most sparsely populated country in the
EU. Virtually every permanent home is within reach of the
fixed telephony network as well as two or three mobile
networks. The main reasons were:
• the multi-operator system and benchmark competition;
• the co-operative system; and
• operators, in particular Sonera during its long distance
monopoly period, extended fixed service even to the
most remote parts of the country19  where commercial
provision is not that economic.
Some private telcos have areas corresponding to Sonera’s
average areas, and do serve these areas.
Studies in Finland as well as elsewhere, within one op-
erator, show that the cost of providing fixed telephony serv-
ice is rather strongly depending on subscriber density. Ru-
ral areas are more expensive. That is not a new finding.
The picture seems to be different if comparing fully
independent operators. Such a comparison has a new ele-
19 Sonera provides fixed telecommunications services to about 3/4 of the land area and about 1/4 of the population, while Finnet and Elisa serve 1/4 of the area and 3/4 of the population. An
extreme example of remote areas: the six most sparsely populated municipalities in Finland have each an average population density of less than 1 person per sq km. Their total area is 54,000
sq km (almost twice the area of Belgium, or almost a quarter of the UK) and their total population is 29,000 persons. These municipalities are also fully served. In addition Finland has
almost 200,000 islands, which are also served if populated. Despite these geographic and demographic features, rural services are not a major issue in Finland.
20 Note that the value of R2 for the trend line is about 0.2, which means that subscriber density has a low correlation to the value of the user basket cost. Many observers agree that the most
important reason for the variations is management capability.
21 Much of the comprehensive - but as such non-profitable - mobile rural area coverage is due to these vacation homes. Many mobile users intentionally used vacation home coverage as the most
important selection criteria for operator selection. This was true for business users as well as private users, as business users often had to be available also during evenings, weekends and
vacations.
Table 14.
Summary of differences between tax financed and
operator financed social services
TAX BASED SOCIAL SERVICE CROSS-SUBSIDISED UNIVERSAL SERVICE
Part of overall social service Special arrangements for one sector
Subsidised services case-by-case basis, Subsidised services to all users independent
abuse can be controlled of need, abuse cannot be controlled
Any appropriate service can Only pre-selected services can be subsidised,
be selected, tailoring normal routine no tailoring
100 % subsidies possible, with ceiling Only minor subsidies possible, does not help
the really needy
Neutral to telecom operators Burden for some telecom operators
Does not distort tariff structure Distorts tariff structure (cross-subsidies)
(cost based)
Open taxation Hidden taxation
Figure 17.
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ment: it includes differences in management skills, plan-
ning, construction and maintenance, etc. Those parame-
ters do not differ within one operator, except over time. It
is interesting to note that in such a comparison average
subscriber density does not necessarily have a significant
impact on cost. See Figure 17.
In the figure each dot represents the value of a stand-
ardised local telephony basket for a telco. Because the
telcos were - and are - financially fully independent, they
received no subsidies, and the bulk of their business was
local telephony, the charges were comparable and fully
cost based.
The average density is not a good measure for the area,
as the population usually is in clusters in villages and
towns, along roads.
One of the peculiarities of Finland is the custom of
having a vacation home, mainly in the archipelago or in
the lake district. About one vacation home per 10 persons
exists. Such vacation homes are not clustered to the same
extent as permanent residences. Most vacation homes are
within the coverage area of a mobile network, even in the
most remote areas21. Fixed telephony access is often also
available, even if there is a heavy surcharge if the dwell-
ing is situated far from existing networks.
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If a Universal Service obligation had been imposed on
fixed services, vacation homes should reasonably have been
excluded. Vacation home users were satisfied with mobile
access. Mobile access also included data communications
access (mobile data, at least for e-mail).
Access to broadband Internet is widely available, but
not yet ubiquitous. In 2000 95 % of the municipalities
were within reach of fibre optic backbone networks. These
municipalities have 99 % of the population. 95 % of the
population reside within a few km distance from a fibre
optic cable. xDSL technology was available in 98 % of the
municipalities in 2002. However, in only 74 % of the
municipalities xDSL was available to more than 50 % of
the households. Cable television broadband access was
available in only 29 % of the municipalities. xDSL was
introduced as recently as 1999. Other technologies (nota-
bly fixed wireless) are also in use, including several trials
of wireless broadband Internet access.
By far the largest investment needed is the access
network. Local and national backbone network investments
are a small fraction of the investment in the access net-
work. The present Government policy is that such access
is needed, but the Government will not assign subsidises
and will not favour any particular technology. Operators
will take care of the needed investments on a commercial
basis. The Government’s objective is that all citizens should
have the possibility to have broadband access in 2005.
For all these reasons, Finland does not see a signifi-
cant need for a distinct Universal Service Policy based on
cross-subsidies (and corresponding market distortion) rath-
er than normal tax financing of services to the needy.
Cultural and educational promotion is also a Govern-
ment task. Virtually all schools have Internet, provided at
normal commercial terms and conditions from normal
educational funds. Most libraries also have Internet ac-
cess free of charge to citizens, also procured at commer-
cial terms and conditions and paid from tax funds. Other
countries have commonly imposed obligations on Internet
access providers to supply schools and libraries etc. at
either heavily subsidised charges or completely free of
charge.
22 In 2001 the average number of Internet users on the tax administration site per month were 100,000, including 7000 individual contacts (most request for information), handled by some 70
full time persons.
In addition to the above, Government actively promotes
e-government by implementing various services on the In-
ternet. Government information is available on the Inter-
net, various forms can be filled in and submitted on-line
or downloaded. The sites of the Ministry of Transport and
Communications and FICORA are no exceptions.
Tax information, tax payment and employer tax report-
ing is easily done using the Internet22. Government use is
developed from data communications arrangements in use
since the early 1980’s, initially for large enterprises. A
majority of enterprises use Internet or other data commu-
nications for tax routines.
 Bank transactions are already almost solely based on
Internet or self-service payment counters. Many of the
young have never seen a cheque but they use Internet and
counters almost daily for payments. Mobile banking (us-
ing handsets) is still developing.
4.10 Separation of operation
and regulation
Separation of operation and regulation is one of the cor-
nerstones in sector restructuring. It is included in EU leg-
islation and e.g. in the WTO Reference Paper on basic
telecommunications.
Finland has policymaking and ownership control of Son-
era in the Ministry of Transport and Communications.
Within the Ministry the two functions were separated
in 1990, on an organisational level as well as on a person-
nel level. The only persons with responsibility for both are
the Minister and the Secretary General. For this reason
Finland does not get full scores for separation.
However, little criticism has been heard due to the dual
role of the Minister and the Secretary. The Finnish multi-
sector structure and the long liberal telecommunications
tradition does not allow for significant double standards.
The regulator FICORA is fully separated from all oper-
ators.
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23 In Finland television receiver fees are payable. The fees are tax-like, one of the few taxes that are earmarked for a particular purpose. The purpose of the fees is to finance the state-owned
public broadcasting company Yleisradio.
One of the key features in the 2002 Communications
Market Act is that regulations with an impact on rights and
obligations of persons either have to be issued by a body
that is controlled by the Legislature (Parliament), or the
right to issue regulations has to be specifically included in
primary legislation. This is a reversal of previous delegation
development, due to the new Finnish constitution.
4.12 Service providers
World-wide policies differ with respect to separation of
networks and services. Some countries pursue a policy
with separation.
Finland included the service provider concept in legis-
lation in 1994. Network operators are obliged to lease
free capacity to service providers. All service providers shall
be treated equally. In addition, network operators with Sig-
nificant Market Power (SMP) have to apply reasonable and
cost-oriented charges. Operators have to separate network
operations, service operations and other business in ac-
counting.
The service provider concept is otherwise not mandat-
ed or specifically supported. The policy is to rely on mar-
ket forces. Operators may freely opt for being network op-
erators, service providers or both combined. The outcome
is that separate service providers (without networks) have
emerged, but their market share is small. Service provid-
ers are usually also network operators.
Some major attempts to separate networks and servic-
es have occurred in Finland. See Table 15.
4.11 Division between
policy and regulation
Policy making has been fully with the Ministry of Transport
and Communications. The Ministry’s importance has in-
creased dramatically with the liberalisation of the sector.
Until 1987 regulation was vested with Sonera. Sonera
thus acted as competitor as well as regulator, a typical
conflict of interest. Perhaps the most important cases oc-
curred when Sonera refused to grant frequencies for some
services competing with its own services.
In 1987 regulation was transferred to the Ministry. In
1988 a separate regulator was created, the present Finnish
Communications Regulatory Authority (FICORA, formerly
named Telecommunications Administration Centre, TAC).
Regulatory tasks have been divided between the Min-
istry and FICORA. When FICORA was created in 1988, it
was a purely technical telecommunications regulator, re-
sponsible for technical inspection, enforcement of tech-
nical regulations and spectrum management. Other regu-
latory matters were vested with the Ministry, including li-
censing, approval of technical standards, financial regu-
lation, and overall monitoring of operators. The Ministry
has the right to decide on individual regulatory issues even
if the decision power lies with FICORA. On the other hand,
the Ministry has the right to delegate power to FICORA.
The Ministry has gradually transferred most regulatory
activities to FICORA. The major regulatory functions still
vested with the Ministry are licensing and issuing part of
regulations. Presently licensing is a minor function, as only
mobile operators need a licence, other operators only need
to give notification. Many minor activities are exempted
even from notification. At present Internet service provi-
sion is not subject to licensing or notification.
FICORA has developed into a multi-sector regulator.
In addition to telecommunications, it is responsible for
postal services, and e-commerce security issues.
FICORA is also responsible for collection of television
receiver fees23.
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In addition to the above major cases a number of inde-
pendent entrant service providers operate in the Finnish
market, e.g. Jippii. None of them has so far become a
major player.
The total revenue of all independent service providers
(including Telia as service provider) is not published. Based
on data in Telecommunications Statistics 2002 the au-
thors estimate is that it may be of the order of 3 % of total
revenue, or perhaps even less.
The main conclusion of the above table and knowl-
edge of case details is that separation of networks and
services in different companies with different owners does
not appear to be a stable long-term arrangement.
Despite regulatory intervention and numerous court
cases, use of other operators’ network capacity has been
rather minimal. In interviews operators point out that no
major business can be based on a competitor’s network.
As a whole the Finnish experience of separation is that
separation of networks and services appears to be an un-
realistic approach. Separation is not properly compatible
with a market economy even with continuous regulatory
intervention. This is the case in particular for fixed te-
lephony.
The problems are not only price, also non-price issues
such as delivery time, repair time, timely information on
availability and technical details, abuse of customer in-
formation, and numerous other issues keep the service
provider’s service level below the level of the network op-
erator’s own service provision. Most or all such abuse
methods are banned in law, but it is not possible to fully
enforce such legislation.
Facilities based competition has been much more suc-
cessful, even with a limited number of players.
Most of the court cases related to telecommunications
regulations are with regard to the interface between net-
work operators and service providers. A normal market
economy arrangement rarely results in such quantities of
court cases. Business should be business, not legal argu-
mentation. Policy and regulation should avoid arrange-
ments resulting in frequent court cases.
Court cases have focussed on pricing, not on non-price
issues. Non-price issues are very hard to demonstrate in a
court, but are nevertheless efficient.
Operators appear to invest in networks only if they can
see a competitive advantage. If investments are available
to operators at the same terms and conditions little com-
petitive advantage can be seen.
Table 15.
Main cases of separation of networks and services
CASE DESCRIPTION
Radiolinja When starting business in 1991, Radiolinja was essentially a service provider. Finnet companies acted as
network operators each investing in the required network in its area. The joint ownership base split, and the
arrangement turned out to be unstable. At present Radiolinja (or the owner Elisa) has bought most of the
leased network to ensure sufficient control, and thus turned into a network operator cum service provider
Telia Telia made several efforts to act as partial service provider in Sonera’s and Radiolinja’s GSM networks,
an overflow type arrangement for areas outside main cities, in one case based on international roaming
arrangements. Commercial negotiations failed, and FICORA and courts stated that the arrangements have
to be agreed on a commercial basis. Finally Telia agreed to be service provider in Radiolinja’s network. Later
Telia changed network operator, to New Finnet, with disturbances in customer relations due to very quick
implementation (a few days). The former network operator Radiolinja was also accused of abusing customer
data for its own marketing in connection to the operator change.
In addition to this country-wide service provider based service Telia also runs another service based on an
own network covering major cities
New Finnet in Turku  A number of New Finnet companies in Turku and surrounding areas agreed that one of the companies
would handle certain common network elements and act as a separate network operator. After Sonera took
over control of that network operator, the arrangement broke down, again showing that full control of the
network is essential
New Finnet mobile After the split of the Finnet group and sale of Radiolinja to Elisa the New Finnet companies decided to create
a third country-wide mobile service. The concept is based on separate network operators and service providers.
Service provision started in 2001, with an “own” service provider, and Telia joining later. The long term
outcome is still to be seen
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Additional information is available on the following web sites:
DOCUMENTS IN ENGLISH ON FINLAND:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS STATISTICS (Ministry of Transport
and Communications, hard copy only, annual statistics book
with comprehensive data about Finland). 2002 edition, 85
pages, available from
http://www.finnetfocus.fi/eng/
CASE MOBILE FINLAND
http://www.mintc.fi/
FINLAND´S WIRELESS VALLEY. FROM INDUSTRIAL
POLICIES TOWARD CLUSTER STRATEGIES
http://www.mintc.fi/
FIXED MOBILE INTERCONNECTION:
THE FINNISH CASE
http://www.itu.int/interconnect/workshop
Table 16.
Information sources on Finnish telecommunications
www.mintc.fi Ministry of Transport and Communications, links to all operators, other links, reports,
other information
www.ficora.fi/englanti/index.html Finnish Communications Authority, legislation and regulations in English
www.sonera.com Sonera, operator
www.elisa.com Elisa, operator
www.finnet.fi/eng/ Finnet Association, association of private telcos (New Finnet), links,
some national statistics
www.telia.fi Telia, operator (only Finnish)
www.songnetworks.fi Song Networks, operator
www.kilpailuvirasto.fi Finnish Competition Authority
5 Additional information sources
MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS FINLAND
PO Box 31
FIN-00023 Government
Finland
Telephone +358 (0)9 160 02
Fax + 358 (0)9 160 28596
www.mintc.fi
